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Inclusion logic is a variant of dependence logic that was shown to have the same expressive power as positive
greatest fixed-point logic. Inclusion logic is not axiomatizable in full, but its first-order consequences can be
axiomatized. In this paper, we provide such an explicit partial axiomatization by introducing a system of natural
deduction for inclusion logic that is sound and complete for first-order consequences in inclusion logic.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we axiomatize first-order consequences of inclusion logic. Inclusion logic was introduced by
Galliani [6]. Together with independence logic, introduced by Gra¨del and Va¨a¨na¨nen [11], inclusion logic is an
important variant of dependence logic, which was introduced by Va¨a¨na¨nen [29] as an extension of first-order
logic and a new framework for characterizing dependency notions. Inclusion logic aims to characterize inclusion
dependencies by extending first-order logic with inclusion atoms, which are strings of the form x1 . . .xn⊆ y1 . . .yn,
where 〈x1, . . . ,xn〉= x and 〈y1, . . . ,yn〉= y are sequences of variables of the same length. Inclusion logic adopts
the team semantics of Hodges [21,22], in which inclusion atoms and other formulas are evaluated in a model with
respect to sets of assignments (called teams), in contrast to single assignments as in the usual first-order logic.
Intuitively the inclusion atom x ⊆ y specifies that all possible values for x in a team X are included in the values
of y in the same team X .
Galliani and Hella proved that inclusion logic is expressively equivalent to positive greatest fixed-point logic
[8]. It then follows from the results of Immerman [23] and Vardi [31] that over finite ordered structures inclusion
logic captures PTIME. Building on these results, Gra¨del defined model-checking games for inclusion logic [9],
which then found applications in [10]. There also emerged some studies [13, 14, 16, 27] on the computational
complexity and syntactical fragments of inclusion logic. Embedding the semantics of inclusion atoms into the
semantics of the quantifiers, Ro¨nnholm [28] introduced the interesting inclusion quantifiers that generalize the
idea of the slashed quantifiers of independence-friendly logic [20] (a close relative to dependence logic). Inclusion
atoms have also found natural applications in a recent formalization of Arrow’s Theorem in social choice in
dependence and independence logic [26]. Motivated by the increasing interest in inclusion logic, we present in
this paper a proof-theoretic investigation of inclusion logic, which is currently missing in the literature.
It is worth noting that inclusion atoms correspond exactly to the inclusion dependencies studied in database
theory. The implication problem of inclusion dependencies, i.e., the problem of deciding whether Γ |= φ for a set
Γ∪{φ} of inclusion dependencies (or inclusion atoms), is completely axiomatized in [4] by the following three
rules/axioms:
• x⊆ x (identity)
• x1 . . .xn ⊆ y1 . . .yn/xi1 . . .xik ⊆ yi1 . . .yik for i1, . . . , ik ∈ {1, . . . ,n} (projection and permutation)
• x⊆ y,y ⊆ z/x⊆ z (transitivity)
The team semantics interpretation for inclusion atoms has recently been ulitized to study the implication problems
of inclusion atoms together with other dependency atoms [15, 18, 19]. In this paper, we study, instead, the
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axiomatization problem of inclusion logic, i.e., inclusion atoms enriched with connectives and quantifiers of
first-order logic. We investigate the problem of finding a deduction system for which the completeness theorem
Γ |= φ ⇐⇒ Γ ⊢ φ (1)
holds for Γ∪{φ} being a set of formulas of the logic.
It is known that dependence logic is not (effectively) axiomatizable, since the sentences of the logic are equi-
expressive with sentences of existential second-order logic (ESO) [29]. Nevertheless, if one restrict the conse-
quence φ in (1) to a first-order sentence and Γ to a set of sentences in dependence logic, the axiomatization can
be found. This is because, finding a model for such a set Γ∪{¬φ} of sentences of dependence logic is the same
as finding a model for a set of ESO sentences (i.e., sentences of the form ∃ f1 . . . fnα for some first-order α),
which is then reduced to finding a model for a set of first-order sentences (of the form α). A concrete system
of natural deduction for dependence logic admitting this type of completeness theorem was given in [25]. The
proof of the completeness theorem uses a nontrivial technique based on the equivalence between a dependence
logic sentence and its so-called game expression (an infinitary first-order sentence describing a semantic game)
over countable models, and the fact that the game expression can be finitely approximated over recursively sat-
urated models. Subsequently, using the similar method a system of natural deduction axiomatizing completely
the first-order consequences in independence logic with respect to sentences was also introduced [12]. These
partial axiomatizations for sentences were first generalized in [24] to cover the cases for formulas by expanding
the language with a new predicate symbol to interpret the teams, and later generalized further in [32] to cover the
case when the consequence φ in (1) is not necessarily first-order itself but has an essentially first-order translation
by applying a trick that involves the weak classical negation ∼˙ and the addition of the RAA rule for ∼˙.
As we will demonstrate formally in this paper, inclusion logic is not (effectively) axiomatizable either. Since
inclusion logic is less expressive than ESO, by the same argument as above, the first-order consequences of
inclusion logic can also be axiomatized. In this paper, we give explicitly such an axiomatization. To be more
precise, we introduce a system of natural deduction for inclusion logic for which the completeness theorem (1)
holds for φ being a first-order formula and Γ being a set of Inc-formulas. Our completeness proof uses the
technique developed in [25] together with the trick in [32]. Our system of inclusion logic is a conservative
extension of the system of first-order logic, in the sense that it has the same rules as that of first-order logic when
restricted to first-order formulas only. The rules for inclusion atoms include some of those introduced in [12], and
the rules characterizing the interactions between inclusion atoms and the connectives and quantifiers appear to
be simpler than the corresponding ones in the systems of dependence and independence logic defined in [12,25].
The RAA rule for ∼˙, being a crucial (yet generally not effective) rule for applying the trick of [32], also behaves
better in our system of inclusion logic than in the systems of dependence and independence logic. In particular,
in the inclusion logic system, with respect to first-order formulas, the RAA rule for ∼˙ becomes effective and also
derivable from other more basic rules.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the basics of inclusion logic, and also give a proof
that inclusion logic is not (effectively) axiomatizable. Section 3 discusses the normal form for inclusion logic.
In Section 4, we define the game expressions and their finite approximations that are crucial for the proof of the
completeness theorem of the system of natural deduction for inclusion logic. We introduce this system in Section
5, and also prove the soundness theorem as well as some useful derivable clauses in the section. The proof of
the completeness theorem will be given in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7 by showing some applications
of our system; in particular, we derive in our system the axioms for anonymity atoms proposed recently by
Va¨a¨na¨nen [30].
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we recall the basics of inclusion logic and prove formally that inclusion logic is not (effectively)
axiomatizable. We consider first-order signaturesL with a built-in equality symbol=. Fix a set Var of first-order
variables, and denote its elements by u,v,w,x,y, . . . (with or without subscripts). First-order L -terms t are built
recursively as usual. First-order L -formulas α are defined by the grammar:
α ::=⊥ | t1 = t2 | Rt1, . . . , tn | ¬α | α ∧α | α ∨α | ∃xα | ∀xα.
3Throughout the paper, we reserve the first greek letters α,β ,γ,δ (with or without subscripts) for first-order
formulas. As usual, we write α → β := ¬α ∨β and α ↔ β := (α → β )∧ (β → α) for first-order formulas α
and β . Formulas φ of inclusion logic (Inc) are defined recursively as follows:
φ ::=⊥ | α | ¬α | x1 . . .xn ⊆ y1 . . .yn | φ ∧φ | φ ∨φ | ∃xφ | ∀xφ
where α is an arbitrary first-order formula. The formula x1 · · ·xn ⊆ y1 . . .yn is called an inclusion atom. Note that
in the literature on inclusion logic, Inc-formulas are usually assumed to be in negation normal form (i.e., negation
occurs only in front of atomic formulas). We do not adopt this convention in this paper, but we do require that
negation in Inc applies only to first-order formulas.
The set Fv(φ) of free variables of an Inc-formula φ is defined inductively as usual except that we now have
the new case
Fv(x1 · · ·xn ⊆ y1 · · ·yn) := {x1, . . . ,xn,y1, . . . ,yn}.
We write φ(x1, . . . ,xk) to indicate that the free variables of φ are among x1, . . . ,xk. Inc-formulas with no free
variable are called sentences. We write φ(t/x) for the formula obtained by substituting uniformly t for x in φ ,
where we assume that t is free for x.
We assume that the domain of a first-order model M has at least two elements, and use the same letter M to
stand for both the model and its domain. An assignment of an L -model M for a set V ⊆ Var of variables is a
function s : V → M. The interpretation of an L -term t under M and s (denoted s(tM)) is defined as usual. For
any sequence x = 〈x1, . . . ,xk〉 of variables, we write s(x1, . . . ,xk) or s(x) for 〈s(x1), . . . ,s(xk)〉. For any element
a ∈M, s(a/x) is the assignment defined as
s(a/x)(y) =
{
a, if y= x;
s(y), otherwise.
A set X of assignments of a model M with the same domain dom(X) is called a team (of M). In particular, the
empty set /0 is a team, and the singleton { /0} is a team with the empty domain.
Definition 2.1 For any L -formula φ of Inc, any L -model M and any team X of M with dom(X) ⊇ Fv(φ),
we define the satisfaction relationM |=X φ inductively as follows:
• M |=X ⊥ iff X = /0.
• M |=X α iff for all s ∈ X ,M |=s α in the usual sense.
• M |=X ¬α iff for all s ∈ X ,M 6|=s α in the usual sense.
• M |=X x⊆ y iff for all s ∈ X , there is s
′ ∈ X such that s(x) = s′(y).
• M |=X φ ∧ψ iff M |=X φ andM |=X ψ .
• M |=X φ ∨ψ iff there exist Y,Z ⊆ X with X = Y ∪Z such thatM |=Y φ andM |=Z ψ .
• M |=X ∃xφ iff M |=X(F/x) φ for some function F : X →℘(M)\ { /0}, where
X(F/x) = {s(a/x) | s ∈ X and a ∈ F(s)}.
• M |=X ∀xφ iff M |=X(M/x) φ , where X(M/x) = {s(a/x) | s ∈ X and a ∈M}.
For any set Γ of Inc-formulas, we write M |=X Γ if M |=X φ for all φ ∈ Γ. We write Γ |= φ if M |=X Γ implies
M |=X φ for all modelsM and teams X . We write simply |= φ for /0 |= φ , and ψ |= φ for {ψ} |= φ . If both φ |= ψ
and ψ |= φ , we wire φ ≡ ψ .
Our version of the team semantics for disjunction and existential quantifier is known in the literature as lax
semantics; see [6] for further discussion. In some literature (e.g., [6]) inclusion atoms are allowed to have arbitrary
terms as arguments, namely strings of the form t1 . . . tn ⊆ t
′
1 . . . t
′
n are considered well-formed formulas, and the
semantics of these inclusion atoms are defined (naturally) as:
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• M |=X t1 · · · tn ⊆ t
′
1 · · · t
′
n iff for all s ∈ X , there is s
′ ∈ X such that s(tM1 , . . . , t
M
n ) = s
′((t ′1)
M, . . . ,(t ′n)
M).
It is easy to verify that inclusion atoms of this type are definable in our version of inclusion logic, since t⊆ t′ ≡
∃xy(x = t∧ y = t′∧ x⊆ y), where ∃v abbreviates ∃v1 . . .∃vk for some k, and u= v is short for
∧
i ui = vi.
For any assignment s and any set V ⊆ Var of variables, we write s ↾V for the assignment s restricted to V . For
any team X , define X ↾V = {s ↾V | s ∈ X}. We list the most important properties of Inc-formulas in the following
lemma. The reader is referred to [6, 8] for other properties.
Lemma 2.2 Let φ be an L -formula, M an L -model, and X, Y , Xi (i ∈ I) arbitrary teams of M with
dom(X),dom(Y ),dom(Xi)⊇ Fv(φ).
Locality: If X ↾ Fv(φ) = Y ↾ Fv(φ), then M |=X φ ⇐⇒ M |=Y φ .
Union Closure: If M |=Xi φ for all i ∈ I, then M |=
⋃
i∈I Xi
φ .
Flatness of First-order Formulas: For any first-order L -formula α ,
M |=X α ⇐⇒ M |={s} α for all s ∈ X .
Consequently, first-order formulas are also downwards closed, that is, M |=X α and Y ⊆ X imply M |=Y α .
If θ is a sentence, the locality property implies that M |={ /0} θ iff M |=X θ for all teams X of M. We call M a
model of θ , writtenM |= θ , ifM |={ /0} θ .
By the result of [6], Inc sentences can be translated into existential second-order logic (ESO), namely, for
every Inc-sentence θ , there exists aESO-sentence τ(θ ) such thatM |= θ iffM |= τ(θ ). SinceESO is well-known
to be compact, it follows that Inc is compact as well, that is, if every finite subset of a set Γ of Inc-sentences has a
model, then the set Γ itself has a model. It was further proved in [8] that Inc is expressively equivalent to positive
greatest fixed point logic (posGFP) in the sense of the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3 ( [8]) For any L -formula φ of Inc with Fv(φ) = {x1, . . . ,xn}, there exists an L (R)-formula
ψ(R) of posGFP with a fresh n-ary relation symbol R such that for all L -models M and teams X of M with
dom(X) = {x1, . . . ,xn},
M |=X φ ⇐⇒ (M,rel(X)) |=s ψ(R) for all s ∈ X ;
and vice versa, where rel(X) = {(s(x1), . . . ,s(xn)) | s ∈ X} is an n-ary relation on M that serves as the interpre-
tation for R. In particular, Inc-sentences can be translated into posGFP and vice versa.
As a consequence of [23], over finite models, Inc and least fixed point logic have the same expressive power.
In particular, by [23, 31], over ordered finite models, Inc captures PTIME.
Due to the strong expressive power, Inc is not (effectively) axiomatizable. We now give an explicit proof of
this fact by following a similar argument to that in [25].1
Consider the signature La = (+,×,<,0,1) of arithmetic. We first show that the non-well-foundedness of <
is definable in Inc.
Proposition 2.4 For any model M in the signature La of arithmetic, M |= ∃x∃y(y ⊆ x∧ y < x) iff <
M is not
well-founded.
P r o o f. It is easy to prove that ∃x∃y(y⊆ x∧ y< x) holds in M iffM contains an infinite <-descending chain
· · ·<M an <
M · · ·<M a1 <
M a0. We leave the proof details to the reader.
Now, put φ = ∃x∃y(y ⊆ x∧ y < x), and let γPA be a (first-order) sentence stating that each of the (finitely
many) axioms of Peano arithmetic except for the axiom schema of induction is true (or γPA is the conjunction of
all axioms of Robinson arithmetic Q). For any La-sentence α of arithmetic, we have that
N |= α iff |= α ∨¬γPA∨φ , (2)
1 The author would like to thank Jouko Va¨a¨na¨nen for suggesting this proof, and the formula used in Proposition 2.4 is taken essentially
from [8].
5whereN is the standard model of Peano arithmetic. To see why, for the left to right direction, suppose thatN |= α
and that M is a model of γPA such that M 6|= φ . By Proposition 2.4, <
M is well-founded. Now, M is a model
satisfying all axioms of Robinson arithmetic (including the axiom ∀x(x = 0∨∃y(y+ 1 = x)) and the axioms
stating that < is a linear ordering), and the ordering <M is a well-ordering. It is then easy to verify that M also
satisfies the (second-order) induction axiom. ThereforeM is (isomorphic to) the standard model N of arithmetic,
and M |= α . Conversely, suppose |= α ∨¬γPA ∨φ . The standard model N of Peano arithmetic clearly satisfies
γPA, and by Proposition 2.4 the model N falsifies φ . Thus we must have that N |= α .
The equivalence (2) shows that truth in the standard model N can be reduced to logical validity in inclusion
logic. This means that validity in inclusion logic is not arithmetical, and therefore inclusion logic cannot have
any (effective) complete axiomatization.
Nevertheless, there can be partial axiomatizations for the logic. The main objective of the present paper is to
introduce a system of natural deduction for Inc that is complete for first-order consequences, in the sense that
Γ ⊢ α ⇐⇒ Γ |= α
holds whenever Γ is a set of Inc-formulas, and α is a first-order formula. Our completeness proof will mainly
follow the argument of [25], which roughly goes as follows: First, we show that any Inc-sentence is semantically
equivalent to a formula φ in certain normal form. Also, in the system to be introduced every Inc-formula implies
its normal form. Then, we show that φ is equivalent over countable models to a first-order sentence Φ of infinite
length (called its game expression). Next, we show that the game expression Φ can be approximated in a certain
sense (in the sense of Theorem 4.2) by some first-order sentences Φn (n ∈ ω) of finite length. Finally, making
essential use of these approximations Φn we will be able to prove the completeness theorem by certain model
theoretic argument, together with a trick developed in [32] using the weak classical negation ∼˙.
3 Normal form
In this section, we prove that every Inc-formula φ(z) is (semantically) equivalent to a formula of the form
∃x∀y(ι(x,y)∧α(x,z)), where ι is a conjunction of inclusion atoms, and α is a first-order quantifier-free for-
mula. This normal form is similar to the normal forms for dependence and independence logic as introduced
in [12, 29]. It is also more refined than the two normal forms for Inc-formulas introduced in the literature, which
we recall in the following.
Theorem 3.1 ( [7]) Every Inc-formula φ(z) is semantically equivalent to a formula of the form
Q1x1 . . .Q
nxnθ (x,z), (3)
where Qi ∈ {∃,∀} and θ is a quantifier free formula.
Proof (sketch). The theorem follows from the fact that
• ¬∀xα ≡ ∃x¬α and ¬∃xα ≡ ∀x¬α for any first-order formula α ,
and the fact that if x /∈ Fv(ψ), then
• ∃xφ ∧ψ ≡ ∃x(φ ∧ψ),
• ∃xφ ∨ψ ≡ ∃x(φ ∨ψ), (4)
• ∀xφ ∧ψ ≡ ∀x(φ ∧ψ),
• ∀xφ ∨ψ ≡ ∃y∃z∀x
(
(φ ∧ y= z)∨ (ψ ∧ y 6= z)
)
, where y,z are fresh variables.
Theorem 3.2 ( [13]) Every Inc-formula φ(z) of the form (3) is semantically equivalent to a formula of the
form
∃x∀y
( ∧
1≤ j≤n
Q j=∀
zx1 . . .x j−1y⊆ zx1 . . .x j−1x j ∧θ (x,z)
)
, (5)
where x= 〈x1, . . . ,xn〉, y is fresh and θ is the quantifier free formula in (3).
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Proof (idea). This theorem is proved by exhaustively applying the equivalences
∀vQxψ(v,x,z) ≡ ∃vQx∀y(zy⊆ zv∧ψ(v,x,z)), (6)
and ∀y1∀y2(z1y1⊆ z1v1∧z2y2⊆ z2v2∧χ(x,z1,z2,v1,v2))≡∀y(z1y⊆ z1v1∧z2y⊆ z2v2∧χ(x,z1,z2,v1,v2)).
We show next that the quantifier-free formula θ in the above two theorems can also be turned into an equivalent
formula in some normal form.
Lemma 3.3 Every quantifier-free Inc-formula θ (z) is semantically equivalent to a formula of the form
∃w
(∧
i∈I
ui ⊆ vi∧α(w,z)
)
, (7)
where α is a first-order quantifier-free formula, and each ui and vi are sequences of variables from w.
P r o o f. We prove the lemma by induction on θ . The case when θ is a first-order formula (including the case
θ = ¬α) is trivial. If θ = x⊆ y, clearly x⊆ y ≡ ∃wu(w⊆ u ∧ w= x ∧ u= y).
Assume that θ0 = ∃w0(ι0(w0)∧α0(w0,x)) and θ1 = ∃w1(ι1(w1)∧α1(w1,y)), where α0,α1 are first-order and
quantifier-free, the sequences w0 and w1 do not have variables in common,
ι0(w0) =
∧
i∈I
ui ⊆ vi and ι1(w1) =
∧
j∈J
u j ⊆ v j. (8)
If θ = θ0∧θ1, then by (4) we have θ0∧θ1 ≡ ∃w0(ι0∧α0)∧∃w1(ι1∧α1)≡ ∃w0∃w1(ι0∧ ι1∧α0∧α1).
If θ = θ0∨θ1, we show that θ is equivalent to
ψ = ∃w0∃w1∃pqp
′q′
(∧
i∈I
(uipq⊆ vipq) ∧
∧
j∈J
(u jp
′q′ ⊆ v jp
′q′)
∧ (α0∨α1)∧ (α0 ↔ p= q)∧ (α1 ↔ p
′ = q′)
)
.
(9)
We first claim that for any first-order formula α , any Inc-formula φ ,
∃x
(∧
i∈I
ui ⊆ vi ∧α
)
∨φ ≡ ∃x∃pq
(∧
i∈I
uipq⊆ vipq ∧ (α ↔ p = q)∧ (α ∨φ)
)
, (10)
where each ui and vi consist of variables from the sequence x = 〈x1, . . . ,xn〉. Then can prove θ0 ∨ θ1 ≡ ψ by
consecutively applying (10) as follows:
∃w0
(∧
i∈I
ui ⊆ vi ∧α0
)
∨θ1
≡ ∃w0∃pq
(∧
i∈I
uipq⊆ vipq ∧ (α0 ↔ p= q)∧
(
α0∨∃w1
(∧
j∈J
u j ⊆ v j ∧α1
)))
≡ ∃w0∃pq
(∧
i∈I
uipq⊆ vipq ∧ (α0 ↔ p= q)
∧∃w1∃p
′q′
(∧
j∈J
u jp
′q′ ⊆ v j p
′q′ ∧ (α1 ↔ p
′ = q′)∧ (α0∨α1)
))
≡ ψ . (by (4))
We now complete the proof by verifying claim (10). For the direction left to right, supposeM |=X ∃x
(∧
i∈I ui⊆
vi ∧α(x,z)
)
∨φ(y,z). Then there are teams Y,Z ⊆ X and suitable sequence of functions F= 〈F1, . . . ,Fn〉 for ∃x
such that X = Y ∪Z, M |=Y(F/x)
∧
i∈I ui ⊆ vi ∧α(x,z) and M |=Z φ(y,z). We now define suitable (sequence of)
functions F′ = 〈F ′1, . . . ,F
′
n〉,G,H for the quantifications ∃x,∃p,∃q as follows: Pick two distinct elements a,b∈M.
7• Define F′ in such a way that the resulting team (F′/x) satisfies
Y (F′/x) = Y (F/x) and (X \Y )(F′/x) = (X \Y )(a/x),
where (X \Y)(a/x) := {s(a/x1) · · · (a/xn) | s ∈ X \Y}. We omit here the precise technical definition.
• Define G : X(F′/x)→℘(M)\ { /0} by taking G(s) = {a}.
• Define H : X(F′/x)(G/p)→℘(M)\ { /0} by taking
H(s) =
{
{a} if M |=s α;
{b} otherwise.
Put W = X(F′/x)(G/p)(H/q). Clearly, M |=W α ↔ p = q. It remains to show that M |=W α ∨ φ and M |=W
uipq⊆ vipq for all i ∈ I.
For the former, define
U = Y (F′/x)(G/p)(H/q) and V = Z(F′/x)(G/p)(H/q).
Clearly W = U ∪V , as X = Y ∪Z. Since M |=Z φ(y,z), M |=Y (F/x) α(x,z) and Y (F/x) = Y (F
′/x), we obtain
M |=V φ(y,z) andM |=U α(x,z) by locality.
For the latter, let s ∈W be arbitrary. If s ∈ U , since M |=Y ui ⊆ vi, there exists t0 ∈ Y such that t0(vi) =
s(ui). Now, since M |=U α(x,z), by the definition of H and G, we know that s(q) = a = s(p). Thus, for
t = t0(a/p)(a/q)∈W , we have t(vipq) = 〈t0(vi),a,a〉= s(uipq).
If s ∈W \U , then s ↾ dom(X) ∈ X \Y and thereby s(x) = 〈a, . . . ,a〉 by the definition of F′. Thus, s(vipq) =
〈a, . . . ,a,s(p),s(q)〉 = s(uipq), namely that s itself is the witness of uipq⊆ vipq for s.
For the direction right to left of the claim (10), suppose there are suitable (sequence of) functions F =
〈F1, . . . ,Fn〉,G,H for the quantifications ∃x∃p∃q such that for W = X(F/x)(G/p)(H/q), we have that M |=W∧
i∈I uipq ⊆ vipq∧ (α ↔ p = q)∧ (α(x,z) ∨ φ(y,z)). Then there are teams U,V ⊆W such that W = U ∪V ,
M |=U α andM |=V φ . Since α is flat, we may letU ⊆W be the maximal such team.
Consider Y =U ↾ dom(X) and Z =V ↾ dom(X). Clearly, X =Y ∪Z, andM |=Z φ(y,z) by locality. It remains
to show thatM |=Y ∃x
(∧
i∈I ui ⊆ vi ∧α
)
.
Define a suitable sequence of functions F′ = 〈F ′1, . . . ,F
′
n〉 for ∃x in such a way that Y (F
′/x) =U ↾ dom(X)∪
{x1, . . . ,xn}. We omit the precise technical definition here. Now, since M |=U α(x,z), we have that M |=Y (F′/x)
α(x,z) by locality. To show that Y (F′/x) satisfies each ui ⊆ vi, take any s ∈ Y (F
′/x). Let sˆ ∈W be an arbitrary
extension of s. Since M |=W uipq ⊆ vipq, there exists t ∈W such that sˆ(uipq) = t(vipq). Since M |=sˆ α(x,z)
and M |=W α ↔ p = q, we have that sˆ(p) = sˆ(q). It then follows that t(p) = t(q), which in turn implies that
M |=t α . Then t ∈U , as U was assumed to be the maximal subteam ofW that satisfies α(x,z). Hence, t0 = t ↾
dom(X)∪{x1, . . . ,xn} ∈ Y (F
′/x) and t0(vi) = t(vi) = sˆ(ui) = s(ui).
Finally, by using the above normal form results we obtain the desired more refined normal form as follows.
Theorem 3.4 Every Inc-formula φ(z) is semantically equivalent to a formula of the form
∃w∃x∀y
(∧
i∈I
ui ⊆ vi ∧
∧
j∈J
zx1 . . .x j−1y⊆ zx1 . . .x j−1x j ∧α(w,x,z)
)
, (11)
where α is a first-order quantifier-free formula, and each ui and vi are sequences of variables from w.
P r o o f. By Theorem 3.1, we may assume that φ is in prenex normal form (3). Furthermore, by Lemma 3.3,
the quantifier free formula θ in (3) is equivalent to a formula of the form (7). Hence, φ(z) is equivalent to a
formula of the form
Q1x1 . . .Q
nxn∃w
(∧
i∈I
ui ⊆ vi ∧α(w,x,z)
)
.
Finally, by applying Theorem 3.2 to the above formula (and rearranging the order of the existential quantifiers)
we obtain an equivalent formula of the form (11).
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To simplify notations in the normal form (11), we now introduce some conventions. For any permutation
f : {1, . . . ,n} → {1, . . . ,n} and k ≤ n, we define a function σ f,k
(·)
: Varn → Vark by taking σ f,kx = xf(1) . . .xf(k) for
any sequence x = 〈x1 . . .xn〉. That is, σ
f,k
x is a sequence of variables from x. When no confusion arises we drop
the superscripts in σ f,kx and write simply σx. We reserve the greek letters pi ,ρ ,σ ,τ (with or without superscripts)
for such functions. The normal form of an Inc-sentence (with no free variables) can then be written as
∃w∃x∀y
(∧
i∈I
ρ iw ⊆ σ
i
w ∧
∧
j∈J
pi jxy⊆ τ
j
x ∧α(w,x)
)
. (12)
Observe that the formula in the above normal form has only one (explicit) universal quantifier (i.e., ∀y).
Yet because of the inclusion atoms pi
j
xy ⊆ τ
j
x in the formula, some existentially quantified variables from x are
essentially universally quantified (cf. equivalence (6)).
4 Game expression and approximations
In this section, we define the game expression Φ for every Inc-sentence φ (with no free variables) in normal
form. Intuitively the formula Φ is a first-order sentence of infinite length that simulates all possible plays in the
semantic game (in team semantics) of the formula φ . Over countable models Φ and φ are equivalent, as we will
show in Theorem 4.1. For a game of finite length n, we define a first-order formula Φn of finite length, called the
n-approximation of Φ. It follows from the model-theoretic argument in [25] that Φ is equivalent to the (infinitary)
conjunction of all its approximations Φn over countable recursively saturated models. These game expressions
and their finite approximations will be cruicial for proving the completeness theorem for the system of Inc to be
introduced in the next section.
Now, let φ be an Inc-sentence (with no free variables). By Theorem 3.4, we may assume that φ is in normal
form (12). We now define the game expression of φ as the following first-order sentence Φ of infinite length:
Φ :=∃w0∃x0∀y0
(
α(w0,x0)∧
∃w1x1∀y1
(
α1(w
1x1)∧ γ1(w0w
1)∧δ1(y0,x0x
1)∧
. . . . . .
∃wnxn∀yn
(
αn(w
nxn)∧ γn(w
n−1wn)∧δn(y0 . . .yn,x0x
1 . . .xn)∧ . . .
)
. . .
))
,
where
• wn = 〈wξ | ξ ∈ En∪Un〉 and x
n = 〈xξ | ξ ∈ En∪Un〉 with
– En being the set of indices 〈ξ , i〉 of variableswξ ,i introduced as witnesses for each ρ
i
w ⊆ σ
i
w with respect
to the variables wξ from w
n−1,
– Un being the set of indices 〈ξ η , j〉 of variables xξ η, j introduced as witnesses for each pi
j
xy ⊆ τ
j
x with
respect to all new pairs xξ yη with xξ from x0x
1 . . .xn−1 and yη from y0 . . .yn (write
An = {ξ η | 〈ξ η , j〉 ∈Un for some j ∈ J},
and note that we are requiring that ξ η /∈ A1∪ . . .An−1);
• αn(w
nxn) :=
∧
ξ∈En∪Un
α(wξ ,xξ );
• γn(w
n−1wn) :=
∧
ξ∈En−1
∧
i∈I
ρ iwξ = σ
i
wξ ,i
;
• δn(y0 . . .yn−1,x0x
1 . . .xn) :=
∧
ξ η∈An
∧
j∈J
pi jxξ yη = τ
j
xξ η, j
.
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φ (see e.g., [5] for the definition of the semantic game for Inc). Each layer of Φ consists of the subformula
∃wnxn∀yn(αn∧ γn∧δn∧ . . . ) with w
0x0 = w0x0 and α0∧ γ0∧δ0 = α(w0,x0)∧⊤∧⊤≡ α(w0,x0). The intuitive
reading of each layer is as follows: Each layer introduces new existentially quantified variables wnxn and one
universally quantified variable yn, and specifies (in αn) that α holds for the existentially quantified variables
wnxn. For each inclusion atom ρ iw ⊆ σ
i
w in φ , with respect to each sequence wξ of existentially quantified
variables introduced in layer n− 1, a witness sequence wξ ,i of variables (as specified in the formula γn), together
with the accompanying sequence xξ ,i, are introduced in layer n as part of w
nxn. Similarly, for each inclusion atom
pi
j
xy⊆ τ
j
x in φ , with respect to each new combination xξ yη ∈ An of existentially quantified variables xξ introduced
up to layer n− 1 and universally quantified variables yη introduced up to layer n, a witness sequence xξ η, j of
variables (as specified in the formula δn) together with the accompanying sequence wξ ,i are introduced in layer n
as part of wnxn. Note that En+1 = {〈ξ , i〉 | ξ ∈ En∪Un, i ∈ I} andUn+1 = {〈ξ η , j〉 | ξ η ∈ An+1, j ∈ J}.
We assume that the reader is familiar with the game-theoretic semantics of first-order and infinitary logic. Let
us now recall the semantic game G(M,Φ) of the formula Φ over a model M, which is an infinite game played
between two players ∀belard and ∃loise. At each round the players take turns to pick elements from M for the
quantified variables wnxn and yn, as illustrated in the following table:
round 0 1 · · · n · · ·
∀ c1 · · · cn · · ·
∃ a0b0 a1b1 · · · anbn · · ·
The choices of the two players generate an assignment s for the quantified variables wnxnyn defined as
s(wnxn) = anbn and s(yn) = cn.
The player ∃loise wins the (infinite) game if for each natural number n,
M |=s αn∧ γn∧δn.
Finally,
M |= Φ ⇐⇒ ∃loise has a winning strategy in the game G(M,Φ),
where a winning strategy for ∃loise is a function that tells her what to choose at each round, and also guarantees
her to win every play of the game. We now show that an Inc-sentence is semantically equivalent to its game
expression over countable models by using the game-theoretic semantics.
Theorem 4.1 Let φ be an Inc-sentence, and M a model. Then
(i) M |= φ =⇒M |= Φ,
(ii) and M |= Φ =⇒M |= φ , whenever M is a countable model.
P r o o f. (i) Suppose M |= φ . Then, there exists a suitable sequence F of functions for ∃w∃x such that for
X = { /0}(F/wx),
M |=X(M/y)
∧
i∈I
ρ iw ⊆ σ
i
w ∧
∧
j∈J
pi jxy⊆ τ
j
x ∧α(w,x). (13)
We proveM |= Φ by constructing a winning strategy for ∃loise in the semantic game G(M,Φ) as follows:
• In round 0, choose any assignment s0 in X , and let ∃loise choose a
0 = s0(w) and b
0 = s0(x). Let s0 be
the assignment for w0x0 generated by ∃loise’s choices so far. By (13), we have that M |=s0 α(w,x), which
impliesM |=s0 α0(w0,x0), thus the winning condition is maintained.
• Let sn−1 be the assignment generated by the choices of the two players up to round n− 1. Assume that we
have maintained that for each wξ xξ in the domain of sn−1, the assignment sξ for wx defined as sξ (wx) =
sn−1(wξ xξ ) is in X , and assume that ∀belard has chosen cn in round n.
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– For any ξ η ∈ An with aξbξ cη the corresponding choices by the two players in (at most) two earlier than
n rounds, the assignment sξ (cη/y)must be in X(M/y). For each j ∈ J, sinceM |=X(M/y) pi
j
xy⊆ τ
j
x , there
exists s′ ∈ X(M/y) such that s′(τ
j
x ) = 〈sξ (pi
j
x),cη 〉. Let ∃loise choose bξ η, j = s
′(x) and aξ η, j = s
′(w).
Clearly, δn is satisfied by the assignment generated by the players’ choices so far, and sξ η, j = s
′ ↾
dom(X) ∈ X .
– Similarly, for any ξ ∈ En−1 and any i ∈ I, by using the fact that sξ ∈ X and M |=X(M/y) ρ
i
w ⊆ σ
i
w, we
can let ∃loise choose aξ ,ibξ ,i so that γn is satisfied by the assignment generated by the players’ choices
so far, and sξ ,i ∈ X .
Moreover, sinceM |=X(M/y) α(w,x) and we have maintained that sξ ∈ X for each ξ ∈ En∪Un, we conclude
that each α(wξ ,xξ ) is satisfied by the assignment sn generated by the choices of the players till round n.
(ii) SupposeM is a countable model of Φ, and ∃loise has a winning strategy in the game G(M,Φ). Let 〈cn〉n<ω
enumerate all elements of M, and let ∀belard play cn at each round n. Suppose s is the assignment generated by
such choices of ∀belard and the corresponding choices of ∃loise given by her winning strategy. Let
X = {sξ | ξ ∈ En∪Un, n< ω},
where recall that sξ is the assignment for wx defined as sξ (wx) = s(wξ xξ ). Observe that X = { /0}(F/wx) for
some suitable sequence F of functions for ∃w∃x. To show M |= φ , it suffices to verify that the team X(M/y)
satisfies (13).
To see thatM |=X(M/y) α(w,x), for any sξ (cη/y) ∈ X(M/y), since ∃loise wins the game, we know thatM |=s
α(wξ ,xξ ), which impliesM |=sξ α(w,x), as desired.
To see that X(M/y) satisfies each pi
j
xy⊆ τ
j
x , take any sξ (cη/y) ∈ X(M/y) and assume ξ η ∈ An. Since ∃loise
wins the game, s satisfies δn, and in particular, M |=s pi
j
xξ
yη = τ
j
xξ η, j
. Thus, for any extension sˆ ∈ X(M/y) of
sξ η, j ∈ X , we have that sˆ(τ
j
x ) = sξ η, j(τ
j
x ) = s(τ
j
xξ η, j
) = s(pi jxξ yη) = 〈s(pi
j
xξ
),cη 〉= sξ (cη/y)(pi
j
xy), as required.
By a similar argument, we can also show that X(M/y) satisfies each ρ iw ⊆ σ
i
w. This then finishes the proof.
For each natural number n < ω , we define the n-approximation Φn of the infinitary sentence Φ as the finite
first-order formula
Φn := ∃w0x0∀y0
(
α0∧∃w
1x1∀y1
(
α1∧ γ1∧δ1∧·· ·∧∃w
nxn∀yn(αn∧ γn∧δn ) . . .
))︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1
.
The semantic game for Φn over a modelM, denoted by G(M,Φn), is defined exactly as the infinite game G(M,Φ)
except that G(M,Φn) has only n+ 1 rounds. Using the game theoretic-semantics we show, as in [25], that the
Φn’s do approximate Φ over recursively saturated models, which (recall from, e.g., [1]) are modelsM such that
for any recursive set {φn(x,y) | n< ω} of formulas,
M |= ∀x
( ∧
n<ω
∃y
∧
m≤n
φm(x,y)→∃y
∧
n<ω
φn(x,y)
)
.
Theorem 4.2 If M is a recursively saturated (or finite) model, then
M |= Φ ⇐⇒ M |= Φn for all n< ω .
In particular, if M is a recursively saturated countable (or finite) model, then
M |= φ ⇐⇒ M |= Φn for all n< ω .
P r o o f. The “in particular” part follows from Theorem 4.1. The direction “=⇒” of the main claim follows
from the observation that a winning strategy for ∃loise in the infnite game G(M,Φ) is clearly also a winning
strategy for ∃loise in the finite game G(M,Φn) for every n< ω . The other direction “⇐=” follows from a similar
argument to that of Proposition 15 in [25], which we omit here.
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Table 1 Rules for equality, connectives and quantifiers
= It = t
t = t ′ φ(t/x)
=Sub
φ(t ′/x)
[α]
D
⊥ ¬I (1)¬α
α ¬α
¬E
φ
[¬α]
D
⊥
RAA (1)α
φ ψ
∧I
φ ∧ψ
φ
∨I
φ ∨ψ
φ
∨I
ψ ∨φ
φ ∧ψ
∧E
φ
φ ∧ψ
∧Eψ φ ∨ψ
[φ ]
D0
χ
[ψ]
D1
χ
∨E (2)χ
φ(t/x)
∃I
∃xφ
D0
∃xφ
[φ ]
D1
ψ
∃E (3)ψ
D
φ
∀I (4)
∀xφ
∀xα
∀E
α(t/x)
∀xφ(y)
∀E0 (5)
φ(y)
D0
∀xφ
[φ(y/x)]
D1
ψ
∀Sub (6)
∀yψ
∀x∀yφ
∀Exc
∀y∀xφ
∀xφ ∀xψ
∀∧Ext
∀x(φ ∧ψ)
∀xφ(x,v)∨ψ(v)
∀∨Ext (7)
∃y∃z∀x((φ ∧ y= z)∨ (ψ ∧ y 6= z))
(1) The undischarged assumptions in the derivation D contain first-order formulas only.
(2) The undischarged assumptions in the derivations D0 and D1 contain first-order formulas only.
(3) x does not occur freely in ψ or in any formula in the undischarged assumptions of D1.
(4) x does not occur freely in any formula in the undischarged assumptions of D.
(5) x is not in the sequence y of free variables of φ .
(6) y does not occur freely in ∀xφ or in any formula in the undischarged assumptions of D1.
(7) x does not occur freely in ψ(v), and y,z are fresh variables.
5 A system of natural deduction for Inc
In this section, we introduce a system of natural deduction for inclusion logic and prove the soundness theorem
of the system. We also prove in the system that every Inc-formula implies its normal form.
Definition 5.1 The system of natural deduction for Inc consists of the rules for equality, connectives and
quantifiers in Table 1, and the rules for inclusion atoms in Table 2, where α ranges over first-order formulas,
and the letters x,y,z, . . . in serif font stand for arbitrary (possibly empty) sequences of variables. The rules with
double horizontal bars are invertible, i.e., they can be applied in both directions.
We write Γ ⊢Inc φ or simply Γ ⊢ φ if φ is derivable from the set Γ of formulas by applying the rules of the
system of Inc. We write simply φ ⊢ ψ for {φ} ⊢ ψ . Two formulas φ and ψ are said to be provably equivalent,
written φ ⊣⊢ ψ , if both φ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ φ .
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Table 2 Rules for inclusion atoms
xyz⊆ uvw
⊆Exc
yxz⊆ vuw
xy ⊆ uv
⊆Ctr
x⊆ u
x⊆ y y ⊆ z
⊆Trs
x⊆ z
y ⊆ x α(x/z)
⊆Cmp (1)
α(y/z)
[y ⊆ x] [¬α(y/z)]
D
⊥ ⊆Exp (2)
α(x/z)
x⊆ y
⊆W∃ (3)
∃w(xw ⊆ yz)
x⊆ y
⊆W∀ (3)
∀w(xz⊆ yw)
∀xφ(x,z)
∀⊆Sim (4)
∃x∀y
(
zy ⊆ zx∧φ(x,z)
)
∃x
(∧
i∈I
ρ ix ⊆ σ
i
x ∧α
)
∨φ
∃⊆Ext (5)
∃x∃uv
(∧
i∈I
ρ ixuv⊆ σ
i
xuv ∧ (α ↔ u= v)∧ (α ∨φ)
)
(1) The free variables of α(x/z) are among x.
(2) The free variables of α(y/z) are among y, and the variables in y do not occur freely in any undischarged assumptions in D.
(3) w is not among xyz.
(4) y is a sequence of fresh variables.
(5) u,v are fresh variables.
As shown in Table 1, restricted to first-order formulas only our system contains all rules of first-order logic
(with equality). But classical rules are in general not sound for non-classical Inc-formulas, such as the rules for
negation and ∀E. As a consequence, our system does not admit uniform substitution.
Recall that the usual disjunction elimination rule (∨E) is not sound for dependence and independence logic
(see [12,25]). In our system of Inc the disjunction does admit the rule ∨E under the side condition that the undis-
charged assumptions in the sub-derivations contain classical formulas only. This side condition however, makes,
among other things, the usual derivation of the distributive law φ ∧ (ψ ∨ χ)/(φ ∧ψ)∨ (φ ∧ χ) not applicable in
the system. This distributive law actually fails in Inc in general, especially when φ is not closed downwards.
The nonstandard features of the disjunction are also reflected in the rules ∀∨Ext and ∃⊆Ext. The invertible rule
∀∨Ext extends the scope of a universal quantifier over a disjunction. The rule ∃⊆Ext extends over a disjunction
the scope of a existential quantifier as well as that of inclusion atoms. These two rules are in a sense ad hoc to
the present system. Simplifying these rules is left as future work.
The universal quantifier of Inc turns out to be a peculiar connective, especially the usual elimination rule
∀xφ/φ(t/x) is not in general sound for arbitrary formulas. For instance, we have |= ∀x(y⊆ x), whereas 6|= y⊆ z.
The two weaker elimination rules ∀E and ∀E0 we include in the system restrict the subformula φ in the premise
either to a first-order formula or a formula in which x is not free. To compensate the weakness of the elimination
rules we also add to our system a substitution rule ∀Sub, an exchange rule ∀Exc, and two rules ∀∧Ext and ∀∨Ext
for extending the scope of universal quantifier over conjunction and disjunction. In this nonstandard setting,
the derivations of some natural and simple rules for universal quantifier become not entirely trivial, as we will
illustrate in the next proposition.
Proposition 5.2 (i) ∀xφ ⊢ ∀yφ(y/x) if y /∈ Fv(∀xφ).
(ii) ∀x(φ ∧ψ) ⊣⊢ ∀xφ ∧∀xψ .
P r o o f. (i). Follows from ∀Sub, since y /∈ Fv(∀xφ).
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(ii). The direction ∀xφ ∧∀xψ ⊢ ∀x(φ ∧ψ) follows from ∀∧Ext. For the other direction, since φ ∧ψ ⊢ φ , by
∀Sub we derive ∀x(φ ∧ψ) ⊢ ∀xφ . Similarly ∀x(φ ∧ψ) ⊢ ∀xψ . Thus ∀x(φ ∧ψ) ⊢ ∀xφ ∧∀xψ by ∧I.
The exchange rule ⊆ Exc and contraction rule ⊆Ctr for inclusion atoms in our system, together with the
rule xy ⊆ uv/xyy ⊆ uvv that we will derive in the next proposition, are clearly equivalent to the projection rule
x1 . . .xn ⊆ y1 . . .yn/xi1 . . .xik ⊆ yi1 . . .yik (i1, . . . , ik ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}). As we mentioned in the introduction, the projec-
tion rule, the transitivity rule ⊆Trs and the reflexivity axiom x ⊆ x (that we will also derive in the proposition
below) form a complete axiomatization of the implication problem of inclusion dependencies in database theory
( [4]). The inclusion compression rule ⊆Cmp is a slight generalization of a similar rule introduced in [12]. The
inclusion expansion rule ⊆Exp characterizes the fact that
Γ,y ⊆ x |= α(y/z) =⇒ Γ |= α(x/z)
whenever variables in y are not free in Γ (observe that in this case Γ,y ⊆ x,¬α(y/z) |=⊥ iff Γ,y⊆ x |= α(y/z)).
The weakening rule via existential quantifier ⊆W∃ was introduced in [17], and the weakening rule via universal
quantifier ⊆W∀ has a similar flavor. The invertiable simulation rule ∀⊆Sim characterizes the fact that universal
quantifiers can be simulated by existential quantifiers with the help of inclusion atoms.
Proposition 5.3 (i) ⊢ x⊆ x.
(ii) If |x|= |y|= |z|, then xy ⊆ zz ⊢ x= y.2
(iii) xy ⊆ uv ⊢ xyy ⊆ uvv.
P r o o f. (i) By = I we have that ⊢ x= x, which implies ⊢ ∀z(x= x) by ∀I. Now, by applying ∀⊆Sim we derive
⊢ ∃z∀y(xy⊆ xz ∧ x= x). Thus ⊢ ∃z∀y(x⊆ x) by ⊆Ctr. Finally we obtain ⊢ x⊆ x by applying ∃E and ∀E0.
(ii) By ⊆Cmp we have xy ⊆ zz, z= z ⊢ x= y. Then, since ⊢ z= z by = I, we obtain xy ⊆ zz ⊢ x= y.
(iii) By ⊆W∃ we have that xy ⊆ uv ⊢ ∃z(xyz ⊆ uvv). Since xyz ⊆ uvv ⊢ y = z by item (ii), we conclude that
xy ⊆ uv ⊢ ∃z(xyz⊆ uvv∧ y = z) ⊢ xyy ⊆ uvv by =Sub.
We now prove the Soundness Theorem of our system.
Theorem 5.4 (Soundness) Let Γ∪{φ} be a set of Inc-formulas. Then
Γ ⊢ φ =⇒ Γ |= φ .
P r o o f. We only verify the soundness of the nontrivial rules ∨E, ∀∨Ext, ⊆Cmp, ⊆Exp, ⊆W∃, ⊆W∀ and
∀⊆Sim. The soundness of ∃⊆Ext follows from (10) in the proof of the disjunction case of Lemma 3.3.
∨E: It suffices to show that ∆0,φ |= χ and ∆1,ψ |= χ imply ∆0,∆1,φ ∨ψ |= χ for any two sets ∆0,∆1 of
first-order formulas. Suppose thatM |=X ∆0∪∆1, and also thatM |=X φ ∨ψ . Then there exist Y,Z ⊆ X such that
X = Y ∪Z, M |=Y φ and M |=Z ψ . Since formulas in ∆0∪∆1 are closed downwards, we have that M |=Y ∆0 and
M |=Z ∆1. It then follows from the assumption that M |=Y χ and M |=Z χ . Now, since χ is closed under unions,
we conclude thatM |=X χ , as required.
∀∨Ext: We first show that ∀xφ(x,v) ∨ψ(v) |= ∃y∃z∀x((φ ∧ y = z) ∨ (ψ ∧ y 6= z)), where x /∈ Fv(ψ) and
y,z /∈ Fv(φ)∪Fv(ψ). Suppose M |=X ∀xφ ∨ψ , where we may w.l.o.g. assume x,y,z /∈ dom(X). Then there
exist Y,Z ⊆ X such that X = Y ∪ Z, M |=Y(M/x) φ and M |=Z ψ . Define functions F : X →℘(M) \ { /0} and
G : X(F/y)→℘(M)\ { /0} as follows: Let a,b be two distinct elements in M.
F(s) =


{a} if s ∈ Y \Z,
{a,b} if s ∈ Y ∩Z,
{b} if s ∈ Z \Y,
and G(s) = {a}.
Now, we split the team X ′ = X(F/y)(G/z)(M/x) into W = {s ∈ X ′ | s(y) = a} and U = {s ∈ X ′ | s(y) = b}.
Clearly,M |=W y= z andM |=U y 6= z. Observe thatW ↾ (dom(X)∪{x}) =Y (M/x) andU ↾ dom(X) = Z. Since
M |=Y(M/x) φ andM |=Z ψ , we conclude thatM |=W φ andM |=U ψ .
2 |x| denotes the length of the sequence x.
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Conversely, supposeM |=X ∃y∃z∀x((φ(x,v)∧ y = z)∨ (ψ(v)∧ y 6= z)). Then there are suitable functions F,G
and teamsY,Z⊆X(F/y)(G/z)(M/x) such that X(F/y)(G/z)(M/x)=Y ∪Z,M |=Y φ ∧y= z andM |=Z ψ∧y 6= z.
Put Y ′ = Y ↾ dom(X) and Z′ = Z ↾ dom(X). Clearly X = Y ′ ∪Z′. To show that M |=X ∀xφ(x,v)∨ψ(v), it then
suffices to verify M |=Y ′ ∀xφ and M |=Z′ ψ . The latter is clear, since M |=Z ψ and x,y,z /∈ Fv(ψ). To see the
former, first observe that for any s ∈ Y and any a ∈M, since s(a/x)(y) = s(y) = s(z) = s(a/x)(z), we must have
that s(a/x) /∈ Z, or s(a/x) ∈ Y . This shows that Y = Y (M/x), thus Y ↾ (dom(X)∪{x}) = (Y ↾ dom(X))(M/x) =
Y ′(M/x). Now, sinceY ↾ (dom(X)∪{x}) satisfies φ , we concludeM |=Y ′(M/x) φ , and thusM |=Y ′ ∀xφ as required.
⊆Cmp: SupposeM |=X y⊆ x andM |=X α(x/z), where the free variables ofα(x/z) are among x. We show that
M |=X α(y/z). For any s ∈ X , since M |=X y ⊆ x, there exists s
′ ∈ X such that s′(x) = s(y). Since M |=X α(x/z)
and α is first-order, we have thatM |=s′ α(x/z), which impliesM |=s α(y/z) by the locality property. Hence, we
conclude that M |=X α(y/z).
⊆Exp: Assume Γ,y ⊆ x,¬α(y/z) |= ⊥, where the free variables of α(y/z) are among y, and the variables
in y do not occur freely in Γ. We show that Γ |= α(x/z). Suppose that M |=X Γ for some nonempty team X . It
suffices to show that M |=s α(x/z) for any s ∈ X . Consider the team X(s(x)/y). Clearly,M |=X(s(x)/y) y ⊆ x. On
the other hand, since the variables in y do not occur freely in Γ, by locality we obtain that M |=X(s(x)/y) Γ. Now,
since X(s(x)/y) 6= /0, the assumption Γ,y ⊆ x,¬α(y/z) |= ⊥ gives that M 6|=X(s(x)/y) ¬α(y/z), which by locality
implies thatM |=s α(x/z), as required.
⊆W∃: It suffices to show that Γ |= x ⊆ y implies Γ |= ∃w(xw ⊆ yz), where w is not among xyz. Suppose
M |=X Γ. By the assumption,M |=X x⊆ y, meaning that for any s ∈ X , there exists s
′ ∈ X such that s′(y) = s(x).
Now, to show thatM |=X ∃w(xw ⊆ yz), we define a function F : X →℘(M)\ { /0} by taking F(s) = {s
′(z)}.
To show that M |=X(F/w) xw ⊆ yz, take any s ∈ X(F/w). Consider the witness s
′
0 ∈ X for x ⊆ y with respect
to s0 = s ↾ dom(X). We have s(xw) = s0(x)s(w) = s
′
0(y)s
′
0(z). Hence, any extension of s
′
0 in X(F/w) witnesses
xw⊆ yz.
⊆W∀: It suffices to show that Γ |= x ⊆ y implies Γ |= ∀w(xz ⊆ yw), where w is not among xyz. Suppose
M |=X Γ, where we may assume w.l.o.g. that w /∈ dom(X) (if not, rename the bound variable w in ∀w(xz ⊆ yw)).
It then follows by locality that M |=X(M/w) Γ as well, and thus M |=X(M/w) x ⊆ y by assumption. To show
M |=X(M/w) xz⊆ yw, take an arbitrary s ∈ X(M/w). Since M |=X(M/w) x⊆ y, there exists s
′ ∈ X(M/w) such that
s′(y) = s(x). Clearly, the assignment s′′ = s′(s(z)/w) belongs to the team X(M/w), and s′′(yw) = s′(y)s(z) =
s(xz), as required.
∀⊆ Sim: For the top to bottom direction, suppose M |=X ∀xφ(x,z). We show that M |=X ∃x∀y
(
zy ⊆ zx∧
φ(x,z)
)
, where variables from y are fresh. Let x = 〈x1, . . . ,xn〉. Define a sequence F = 〈F1, . . . ,Fn〉 of functions
for ∃x by taking Fi(s) = M for each Fi from F, namely, we let X(F/x) = X(M/x). It suffices to show that
M |=X(F/x)(M/y) zy ⊆ zx∧φ(x,z), orM |=X(M/x)(M/y) zy ⊆ zx∧φ(x,z)
By assumption, M |=X(M/x) φ(x,z), which implies M |=X(M/x)(M/y) φ(x,z). To show that zy ⊆ zx is also
satisfied by X(M/x)(M/y), take any s ∈ X(M/x)(M/y). Observe that the function s′ = s(s(y)/x) belongs to the
team X(M/x)(M/y), and we have that s′(zx) = s(z)s(y), as required.
For the bottom to top direction, suppose M |=X ∃x∀y
(
zy ⊆ zx∧φ(x,z)
)
, where no variable from y are free in
φ , and we may assume w.l.o.g. that dom(X) consists of all variables from z. Then there are suitable sequence F of
functions for ∃x such thatM |=X(F/x)(M/y) zy⊆ zx∧φ(x,z). We show thatM |=X ∀xφ(x,z), orM |=X(M/x) φ(x,z),
which, by locality, is further reduced to showing that X(F/x) = X(M/x).
For any s ∈ X(M/x), consider an arbitrary assignment t ∈ X(F/x)(M/y) satisfying t(z) = s(z) and t(y) = s(x).
Since M |=X(F/x)(M/y) zy ⊆ zx, there exists t
′ ∈ X(F/x)(M/y) such that t ′(zx) = t(zy) = s(z)s(x), meaning that
s= t ′ ↾ dom(X)∪{x1, . . . ,xn} ∈ X(F/x). Thus, X(M/x)⊆ X(F/x), thereby X(M/x) = X(F/x).
We will prove the completeness theorem of our system in the next section. An important lemma for this
proof is that every formula provably implies its normal form (12). To prove this lemma we first prove a few
useful propositions. The next three propositions concern the standard properties of quantifications as well as the
monotonicity of the entailment relation in Inc. In the sequel, we will often apply Propositions 5.5 and 5.6 without
explicit reference to them.
Proposition 5.5 Let α be a first-order formula, and x /∈ Fv(ψ).
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(i) ¬∀xα ⊣⊢ ∃x¬α and ¬∃xα ⊣⊢ ∀x¬α .
(ii) ∀xφ ∧ψ ⊣⊢ ∀x(φ ∧ψ).
(iii) ∃xφ ∧ψ ⊣⊢ ∃x(φ ∧ψ).
(iv) ∃xφ ∨ψ ⊣⊢ ∃x(φ ∨ψ).
P r o o f. Since our system behaves exactly like first-order logic when restricted to first-order formulas only,
item (i) can be proved as usual. Items (iii) and (iv) are proved also as usual. We only derive item (ii). For the
right to left direction, we have by Proposition 5.2(ii) that ∀x(φ ∧ψ) ⊢ ∀xφ ∧∀xψ . Since x /∈ Fv(ψ), ∀xψ ⊢ ψ
by ∀E0. Thus ∀x(φ ∧ψ) ⊢ ∀xφ ∧ψ . For the other direction, since φ ,ψ ⊢ φ ∧ψ and x /∈ Fv(ψ), we derive by
applying ∀Sub that ∀xφ ,ψ ⊢ ∀x(φ ∧ψ), thus ∀xφ ∧ψ ⊢ ∀x(φ ∧ψ).
We write φ(θ ) to indicate that φ is a formula with an occurrence of θ as a subformula, and write φ [θ ′/θ ] for
the formula obtained from φ by replacing the occurrence of θ by θ ′.
Proposition 5.6 If θ ⊣⊢ θ ′, then φ(θ ) ⊣⊢ φ [θ ′/θ ]. Moreover, if the occurrence of θ in φ(θ ) is not in the
scope of a negation, then θ ⊢ θ ′ implies φ(θ ) ⊢ φ [θ ′/θ ].
P r o o f. A routine inductive proof. Apply ∀Sub in the case φ = ∀xψ .
Proposition 5.7 Let φ be a formula and Qxθ the semantically equivalent formula in prenex normal form as
given in Theorem 3.1, where Qx = Q1x1 · · ·Q
nxn (Q
i ∈ {∀,∃}) is a sequence of quantifiers and θ is a quantifier
free formula. Then φ ⊣⊢Qxθ .
P r o o f. Repeatedly apply Propositions 5.5, 5.6 and ∀∨Ext (c.f. the proof of Theorem 3.1).
The next technical proposition shows, as a generalization of the rule ∀⊆Sim, that universal quantifiers in a
more general context can also be simulated using existential quantifiers and inclusion atoms.
Proposition 5.8 ∀xQuφ(u,x,z) ⊣⊢ ∃xQu∀y
(
zy ⊆ zx∧φ(u,x,z)
)
.
P r o o f. We derive the proposition as follows:
∀xQuφ(u,x,z) ⊣⊢ ∃x∀y
(
zy ⊆ zx∧Quφ(u,x,z)
)
(∀⊆Sim)
⊣⊢ ∃x
(
∀y(zy ⊆ zx)∧Quφ(u,x,z)
)
⊣⊢ ∃xQu
(
∀y(zy ⊆ zx)∧φ(u,x,z)
)
⊣⊢ ∃xQu∀y
(
zy⊆ zx∧φ(u,x,z)
)
.
Lemma 5.9 For any Inc-formula φ , we have that φ ⊢ φ ′, where φ ′ is the semantically equivalent formula in
normal form (11) as given in Theorem 3.4.
P r o o f. We follow a similar argument to that of the semantic proof of Theorem 3.4. First, by Proposition
5.7, we obtain φ ⊢ Qxθ , where Qxθ is the semantically equivalent formula of φ as given in Theorem 3.1 with
Qx= Q1x1 · · ·Q
nxn (Q
i ∈ {∀,∃}) a sequence of quantifiers and θ a quantifier free formula.
If we can show that θ ⊢ ∃wθ ′ for some formula θ ′ =
∧
i∈I ui ⊆ vi ∧α(w,x,z) as given in Lemma 3.3, we may
obtain φ ⊢Qx∃wθ ′ by Proposition 5.6. Next, we derive
Qx∃wθ ′ ⊢ ∃x∃w∀y
( ∧
1≤ j≤n
Q j=∀
zx1 . . .x j−1y j ⊆ zx1 . . .x j−1x j ∧θ
′(w,x,z)
)
(Proposition 5.8)
where y = 〈y j | Q
j = ∀, 1≤ j ≤ n〉
⊢ ∃w∃x
( ∧
1≤ j≤n
Q j=∀
∀y j(zx1 . . .x j−1y j ⊆ zx1 . . .x j−1x j) ∧θ
′(w,x,z)
)
(Proposition 5.5(ii))
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⊢ ∃w∃x
( ∧
1≤ j≤n
Q j=∀
∀y(zx1 . . .x j−1y⊆ zx1 . . .x j−1x j) ∧θ
′(w,x,z)
)
(Proposition 5.2(i))
⊢ ∃w∃x∀y
( ∧
1≤ j≤n
Q j=∀
zx1 . . .x j−1y⊆ zx1 . . .x j−1x j ∧θ
′(w,x,z)
)
. (Proposition 5.2(ii))
Putting all these together, we will complete the proof.
Now, we show that θ ⊢ ∃wθ ′ by induction on θ . The case θ is a first-order formula (including the case
θ = ¬α) is trivial. If θ = x⊆ y, we have that x⊆ y ⊢ ∃wu
(
w⊆ u ∧ w = x ∧ u= y
)
. Indeed, we first derive that
⊢ x = x∧ y = y ⊢ ∃w∃u(w = x∧u= y) by = I and ∃I. Then, by =Sub we derive that x⊆ y ⊢ ∃wu
(
x⊆ y ∧ w =
x ∧ u= y
)
⊢ ∃wu
(
w⊆ u ∧ w= x ∧ u= y
)
.
Assume that θ0 ⊢ ∃w0(ι0(w0)∧α0(w0,x)) and θ1 ⊢ ∃w1(ι1(w1)∧α1(w1,y)), where α0,α1 are first-order and
quantifier-free, the sequences w0 and w1 do not have variables in common, and ι0 and ι1 are as in (8) in the proof
of Lemma 3.3.
If θ = θ0 ∧ θ1, then we derive that θ0 ∧ θ1 ⊢ ∃w0(ι0 ∧α0)∧∃w1(ι1 ∧α1) ⊢ ∃w0∃w1(ι0 ∧ ι1 ∧α0 ∧α1) by
Proposition 5.5(iii).
If θ = θ0∨θ1, let ψ be the formula (9) as in the proof of the disjunction case of Lemma 3.3. We derive θ ⊢ ψ
by following the semantic argument as in Lemma 3.3, in which we apply the rule ∃⊆Ext in the crucial steps.
We end this section by proving some facts concerning the weak classical negation ∼˙ in the context of Inc. This
connective was introduced in [32], and a trick using ∼˙ was developed in the paper to generalize the proof of the
completeness theorem of dependence logic given in [25]. We will also apply this trick to prove the completeness
theorem for our system in the next section. Recall that the team semantics of ∼˙ is defined as
• M |=X ∼˙φ iff X = /0 orM 6|=X φ .
The weak classical negations ∼˙φ of Inc-formulas φ are not in general expressible in Inc (because positive greatest
fixed point logic, being expressively equivalent to Inc, is not closed under classical negation). Nevertheless, the
weak classical negations ∼˙α of first-order formulas α are expressible (uniformly) in Inc,:
Fact 5.10 If α(x) is a first-order formula, then ∼˙α(x)≡∃y(y ⊆ x∧¬α(y/x)), where y is a sequence of fresh
variables.
P r o o f. Since α is flat, for any nonempty team X , M 6|=X α(x), iff M |=s ¬α(x) for some s ∈ X , iff M |=X
∃y(y ⊆ x∧¬α(y/x)).
Stipulating the string ∼˙α(x) as a shorthand for the formula ∃y(y ⊆ x∧¬α(y)) of Inc, we show next that the
reductio ad absurdum (RAA) rule for ∼˙ with respect to first-order formulas α , i.e., the rule
[∼˙α]
...
⊥
RAA∼˙α
is derivable in our system from the rule ⊆Exp.
Lemma 5.11 If Γ,∼˙α ⊢ ⊥, then Γ ⊢ α .
P r o o f. Let α = α(x) and ∼˙α(x) = ∃y(y ⊆ x∧¬α(y/x)), where y is a sequence of fresh variables. Suppose
Γ,∼˙α ⊢ ⊥. By ⊆Exp, it suffices to show that Γ,y ⊆ x,¬α(y/x) ⊢ ⊥. But this follows easily from ∃I and the
assumption Γ,∼˙α ⊢ ⊥.
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6 The completeness theorem
In this section, we prove the completeness theorem for our system of Inc with respect to first-order consequences.
To be precise, we prove that
Γ ⊢ α ⇐⇒ Γ |= α (14)
holds whenever Γ is a set of Inc-formulas, and α is a first-order formula. As sketched in Section 2, our proof
combines the technique introduced in [25] and a trick developed in [32] using the weak classical negation ∼˙ and
the RAA rule for ∼˙. The former treats the case when the set Γ∪ {α} of formulas in (14) are sentences (with
no free variables) only, while the trick of the latter allows us to handle (open) formulas as well. Since the weak
classical negation ∼˙α of first-order formulas α are definable uniformly in Inc (Fact 5.10), and the RAA rule for
∼˙ is derivable in our system of Inc (Lemma 5.11), we will be able to apply the trick of [32] in a smoother manner
than in the systems of dependence and independence logic [32] (in which the RAA rule for ∼˙ was added in an ad
hoc and non-effective manner).
We have prepared in the previous sections most relevant lemmas for the argument in [25] concerning the
normal form of Inc-formulas (especially Lemma 5.9), the game expression and its approximations. Another
important lemma for the completeness theorem is that any Inc-formula φ implies every approximation Φn of its
game expression (as introduced in Section 4).
Lemma 6.1 For any Inc-sentence φ , we have that φ ⊢ Φn for every n< ω .
In order to prove the above lemma, we first need to prove a number of technical propositions and lemmas.
Proposition 6.2 Let ρ : Varn → Vark,σ : Varn → Varm be functions. Then
ρxz⊆ σx,x0y0z0 ⊆ xyz ⊢ ∃x1y1(x1y1 ⊆ xy ∧ ρx0z0 = σx1),
where |x| = |x0| = |x1|, |y| = |y0| = |y1| and |z| = |z0|. In particular, when z and z0 are the empty sequence we
have that ρx ⊆ σx,x0y0 ⊆ xy ⊢ ∃x1y1(x1y1 ⊆ xy ∧ ρx0 = σx1).
P r o o f. Assume that p(x) = σxτx for some permutation p of the sequence x. Then we have
ρxz⊆ σx,x0y0z0 ⊆ xyz
⊢ρxz⊆ σx∧ρx0z0 ⊆ ρxz (⊆Ctr, ⊆Exc)
⊢ρx0z0 ⊆ σx (⊆Trs)
⊢∃wy1(ρx0z0wy1 ⊆ σxτxy) (⊆W∃, where |w|= |τx|)
⊢∃x1wy1(p(x1) = ρx0z0w ∧ ρx0z0wy1 ⊆ σxτxy) (= I, ∃I, |ρx0z0w|= |x|)
⊢∃x1wy1(σx1τx1 = ρx0z0w ∧ p(x1)y1 ⊆ p(x)y) (=Sub)
⊢∃x1y1(σx1 = ρx0z0 ∧ p(x1)y1 ⊆ p(x)y) (since |σx1 |= |σx|= |ρx0z0|)
⊢∃x1y1(σx1 = ρx0z0 ∧ x1y1 ⊆ xy). (⊆Exc)
We say that an occurrence of a subformula θ in φ(θ ) is not in the scope of a disjunction or negation if (1)
φ = θ ; or (2) φ = ψ(θ )∧ χ or χ ∧ψ(θ ), and θ is not in the scope of a disjunction or negation in ψ(θ ); or
(3) φ = Qxψ(θ ) (Q ∈ {∀,∃}) and θ is not in the scope of a disjunction or negation in ψ(θ ). For example, in
the formula (φ(θ )∨ψ)∧∃xθ , the leftmost occurrence of θ is in the scope of a disjunction, while the rightmost
occurrence of θ is not.
Lemma 6.3 If the occurrence of the subformula θ in φ(θ ) is not in the scope of a disjunction or negation,
then φ(θ ),ψ ⊢ φ [θ ∧ψ/θ ].
P r o o f. A routine inductive proof. Apply ∀Sub, ∃E, ∃I in the quantifier cases.
Proposition 6.4 Suppose that φ(x ⊆ y) is a formula in which the occurrence of x⊆ y is not in the scope of a
disjunction or negation, and the variables from y are free in φ . If z does not have any common variable with xy,
and w contains some variables occurring in φ (either free or bound), then ∀zφ(x⊆ y) ⊢ ∀zφ [xw ⊆ yz/x⊆ y].
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P r o o f. We prove the proposition by induction on φ . If φ = x ⊆ y, since no variable from z occurs in x ⊆ y,
we derive by ∀E0 that ∀z(x⊆ y) ⊢ x⊆ y. Next, we obtain by ⊆W∀ that x⊆ y ⊢ ∀z(xw ⊆ yz). Thus, ∀z(x ⊆ y) ⊢
∀z(xw ⊆ yz) follows.
If φ = ψ(x⊆ y)∧ χ , then we have that
∀z(ψ(x⊆ y)∧ χ) ⊢∀zψ(x⊆ y)∧∀zχ (Proposition 5.2(ii))
⊢∀zψ [xw ⊆ yz/x⊆ y]∧∀zχ (induction hypothesis)
⊢∀z(ψ [xw ⊆ yz/x⊆ y]∧ χ). (Proposition 5.2(ii))
The case φ = χ ∧ψ(x⊆ y) is symmetric.
If φ = ∀vψ(x⊆ y), then we have that
∀z∀vψ(x⊆ y) ⊢ ∀v∀zψ(x⊆ y) (∀Exc)
⊢ ∀v∀zψ [xw⊆ yz/x⊆ y] (induction hypothesis)
⊢ ∀z∀vψ [xw⊆ yz/x⊆ y]. (∀Exc)
If φ = ∃vψ(x⊆ y), where Fv(∃vψ) = u (note that all variables from y are among u), then we have that
∀z∃vψ(x⊆ y) ⊢∃z∃v∀z0(uz0 ⊆ uz∧ψ(x⊆ y)) (Proposition 5.8, where z0 are fresh)
⊢∃z∃v(∀z0(uz0 ⊆ uz)∧∀z0ψ(x⊆ y)) (Proposition 5.2(ii))
⊢∃z∃v(∀z0(uz0 ⊆ uz)∧∀z0ψ [xw ⊆ yz0/x⊆ y]) (induction hypothesis)
⊢∃z∃v∀z0(uz0 ⊆ uz∧ψ [xw⊆ yz0/x⊆ y]) (Proposition 5.2(ii))
⊢∃z∃v∀z0(uz0 ⊆ uz∧ yz0 ⊆ yz∧ψ [xw ⊆ yz0/x⊆ y]) (⊆Ctr)
⊢∃z∃v∀z0(uz0 ⊆ uz∧ψ [xw⊆ yz0∧ yz0 ⊆ yz/x⊆ y])
(Proposition 6.3, ∵ xw⊆ yz0 is not in the scope of a disjunction or negation)
⊢∃z∃v∀z0(uz0 ⊆ uz∧ψ [xw⊆ yz/x⊆ y])
(⊆Trs, Proposition 5.6, ∵ x⊆ y cannot occur in the scope of a negation)
⊢∀z∃vψ [xw⊆ yz/x⊆ y].
(Proposition 5.8, ∵ variables in w are either bound in ψ [xw⊆ yz/x⊆ y], or among u)
Now we are ready to give the proof of Lemma 6.1.
Proof of Lemma 6.1. By Lemma 5.9, we may assume that φ is in normal form (12). We prove the lemma by
proving a stronger claim that φ ⊢Φ′n holds for every n< ω , where
Φ′n := ∃w0∃x0∀y0
(
α0∧µ0∧∃w
1x1∀y1
(
λ1∧µ1∧·· ·∧∃w
nxn∀yn(λn∧µn)) . . .
)))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1
,
where each λn = αn∧ γn∧δn,
µ0 =
∧
i∈I
ρ iw0 ⊆ σ
i
w0
∧
∧
j∈J
pi jx0y0 ⊆ τ
j
x0
and µn =
∧
ξ∈En∪Un
wξ xξ ⊆ w0x0.
If n= 0, then Φ′0 := ∃w0x0∀y0(α(w0,x0)∧µ0), and φ ⊢Φ
′
0 can be derived by simply renaming the variables.
Now, assuming φ ⊢Φ′n, we show that φ ⊢Φ
′
n+1 by deriving Φ
′
n ⊢Φ
′
n+1.
First, for each ξ ∈ En and each i ∈ I, by Proposition 6.2 we derive that
ρ iw0 ⊆ σ
i
w0
,wξ xξ ⊆ w0x0 ⊢ ∃wx(wx⊆ w0x0∧ρ
i
wξ
= σ iw),
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which, by ⊆Cmp, yields
α(w0,x0),ρ
i
w0
⊆ σ iw0 ,wξ xξ ⊆ w0x0 ⊢ ∃wx(wx⊆ w0x0∧ρ
i
wξ
= σ iw∧α(w,x)). (15)
Similarly, for each ξ η ∈ An+1 and j ∈ J, we derive also by Proposition 6.2 and ⊆Cmp that
α(w0,x0),pi
j
x0
y0 ⊆ τ
j
x0
,wξ xξ yη ⊆ w0x0y0 ⊢∃wx(wx⊆ w0x0∧pi
j
xξ
yη = τ
j
x ∧α(w,x)). (16)
Next, we derive that
Φ′n ⊢∃w0∃x0∀y0
(
α0∧µ0∧∃w
1x1∀y1
(
· · · ∧∃wnxn∀yn
(
λn∧µn
∧α(w0,x0)∧
(∧
i∈I
ρ iw0 ⊆ σ
i
w0
)
∧
( ∧
ξ∈En∪Un
wξxξ ⊆ w0x0
)
∧
(∧
j∈J
pi jx0y0 ⊆ τ
j
x0
)
∧
∧
ξ η∈An+1
wξ xξ ⊆ w0x0
)
. . .
))
(Proposition 5.5(ii)(iii))
⊢∃w0∃x0∀y0
(
α0∧µ0∧∃w
1x1∀y1
(
· · · ∧∃wnxn∀yn
(
λn∧µn
∧α(w0,x0)∧
(∧
i∈I
ρ iw0 ⊆ σ
i
w0
)
∧
( ∧
ξ∈En∪Un
wξxξ ⊆ w0x0
)
∧
(∧
j∈J
pi jx0y0 ⊆ τ
j
x0
)
∧
∧
ξ η∈An+1
wξ xξ yη ⊆ w0x0y0
)
. . .
)
(Proposition 6.4 applied to the subformula ∀y0(α0∧ . . .) and each wξ xξ ⊆ w0x0)
⊢∃w0∃x0∀y0
(
α0∧µ0∧·· ·∧∃w
nxn∀yn
(
λn∧µn∧∧
ξ∈En∪Un,i∈I
∃wξ ,ixξ ,i(α(wξ ,i,xξ ,i)∧ρ
i
wξ
= σ iwξ ,i ∧wξ ,ixξ ,i ⊆ w0x0)
∧
∧
ξ η∈An+1, j∈J
∃wξ η, jxξ η, j(α(wξ η, j ,xξ η, j)∧pi
j
xξ
yη = τ
j
xξ η, j
∧wξ η, jxξ η, j ⊆ w0x0)
)
. . .
)
(by (15) & (16))
⊢∃w0∃x0∀y0
(
α0∧µ0∧·· ·∧∃w
nxn∀yn
(
λn∧µn
∧∃〈wξ xξ | ξ ∈ En+1〉
(
γn+1∧
∧
ξ∈En+1
(α(wξ ,xξ )∧wξ xξ ⊆ w0x0)
)
∧∃〈wξ xξ | ξ ∈Un+1〉
(
δn+1∧
∧
ξ∈Un+1
(α(wξ ,xξ )∧wξ xξ ⊆ w0x0)
))
. . .
)
⊢∃w0∃x0∀y0
(
α0∧µ0∧·· ·∧∃w
nxn∀yn
(
λn∧µn∧∃w
n+1xn+1(λn+1∧µn+1)
)
. . .
)
⊢∃w0∃x0∀y0
(
α0∧µ0∧·· ·∧∃w
n+1xn+1∀yn+1(λn+1∧µn+1) . . .
)
, i.e., Φ′n+1.
(∀I, as yn+1 does not occur in λn+1∧µn+1)
This finishes the proof.
Finally, we are in a position to prove the completeness theorem of our system.
Theorem 6.5 (Completeness) Let Γ be a set of Inc-formulas, and α a first-order formula. Then
Γ |= α ⇐⇒ Γ ⊢Inc α.
P r o o f. The direction “⇐=” follows from the soundness theorem. For the direction “=⇒”, since Inc is
compact, we may without loss of generality assume that Γ is finite. Suppose now Γ |= α and Γ 0Inc α . Claim
that ∃z(
∧
Γ∧∼˙α) 0Inc ⊥, where z lists all free variables in Γ and ∼˙α . Indeed, if ∃z(
∧
Γ∧∼˙α) ⊢Inc ⊥, then we
derive Γ,∼˙α ⊢Inc ⊥ by ∃I, and further Γ ⊢Inc α by Lemma 5.11; a contradiction.
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Now, let ∆ = {Φn | φ = ∃z(
∧
Γ∧∼˙α) and n< ω}. By Lemma 6.1, we must have that ∆ 0Inc ⊥. It follows that
∆ 0FO ⊥, since ∆∪{⊥} is a set of first-order formulas, and the deduction system of Inc has the same rules as that
of first-order logic when restricted to first-order formulas. By the completeness theorem of first-order logic, we
know that the set ∆ of approximations of φ has a modelM. By [1], every infinite model is elementary equivalent
to a recursively saturated countable model. Thus, we may assume that M is a recursively saturated countable or
finite model. By Theorem 4.2,M is also a model of ∃z(
∧
Γ∧∼˙α), therebyM |={ /0}(F/z) Γ andM 6|={ /0}(F/z) α for
some suitable sequence F of functions for ∃z. Hence Γ 6|= α .
7 Applications
In this final section of the paper, we illustrate the power of our system of Inc by discussing some applications.
Recall from Proposition 2.4 that the sentence ∃x∃y(y⊆ x∧ y< x) defines the fact that < is not well-founded.
By the completeness theorem (Theorem 6.5) we proved in the previous section, all first-order consequences of
the non-well-foundedness of < are derivable in our system. For instance, the property that there is a <-chain
of length n for any natural number n, and the property that this <-chain of length n descends from the greatest
element (if exists). We now give explicit derivations of these properties in the example below.
Example 7.1 Write x1 < x2 < · · ·< xn for
∧n−1
i=1 xi < xi+1. For any n ∈N,
(i) ∃x∃y(y⊆ x∧ y< x) ⊢ ∃x1 . . .∃xn(x1 < x2 < · · ·< xn),
(ii) ∃x∃y(y⊆ x∧ y< x),∀y(y< x0∨ y= x0) ⊢ ∃x1 . . .∃xn(x1 < · · ·< xn < x0).
P r o o f. (i) We only give an example of the proof for n= 3.
∃x∃y(y⊆ x∧ y< x) ⊢∃x∃y∃z(yz⊆ xy∧ y< x) (⊆W∃)
⊢∃x∃y∃z(yz⊆ xy∧ z< y∧ y< x) (⊆Cmp)
⊢∃x1∃x2∃x3(x1 < x2∧ x2 < x3) (∧E and renaming bound variables)
(ii) In view of item (i), it suffices to show ∃x1 . . .∃xn(x1 < · · · < xn),∀y(y < x0 ∨ y = x0) ⊢ ∃x1 . . .∃xn(x1 <
· · · < xn < x0). But this is derivable in the system of first-order logic, and the same proof can also be performed
in the system of Inc.
In Proposition 5.3 in section 5 we have derived some interesting clauses in our system of Inc. It is interesting
to note that the formulas on the right side of the turnstile (⊢) in items (i)(iii) of the proposition are not first-
order formulas. While our completeness theorem (Theorem 6.5) does not apply to these cases, these clauses are
indeed derivable. We now give some more examples in which our system can be successfully applied to derive
non-first-order consequences in Inc.
Consider the so-called anonymity atoms, introduced in [5] and studied recently by Va¨a¨na¨nen [30] motivated
by concerns in data safety. These atoms are strings of the form x1 . . .xnϒy1 . . .ym with the team semantics:
• M |=X xϒy iff for all s ∈ X , there exists s
′ ∈ X such that s(x) = s′(x) and s(y) 6= s′(y).
Note that the anonymity atoms corresponds exactly to afunctional dependencies studied in database theory (see
e.g., [2, 3]). It was proved in [5] that first-order logic extended with anonymity atoms is expressively equivalent
to inclusion logic, and in particular,
xϒy ≡ ∃v(xv ⊆ xy∧ v 6= y),
where v 6= y is short for
∨
i vi 6= yi. We will then use xϒy as a shorthand for the above equivalent Inc-formula.
Write ϒx for 〈〉ϒx, and stipulate xϒ = xϒ〈〉 :=⊥. The implication problem of anonymity atoms is shown in [30]
to be completely axiomatized by the rules listed in the next example (read the clauses in the example as rules).
We now illustrate that in our system of Inc all these rules are derivable.
Example 7.2 (i) xyzϒuvw ⊢ yxzϒuvw∧ xyzϒvuw (permutation).
(ii) xyϒz ⊢ xϒzu (monotonicity).
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(iii) xyϒzy ⊢ xyϒz (weakening).
(iv) xϒ ⊢ ⊥.
P r o o f. Item (i) follows easily from ⊆Exc, and item (iv) is trivial. We only prove the other two items. For
item (ii), note that xyϒz := ∃v(xyv ⊆ xyz∧ v 6= z), and we have that
∃v(xyv ⊆ xyz∧ v 6= z) ⊢∃v(xv ⊆ xz∧ v 6= z) (⊆Ctr)
⊢∃vw(xvw ⊆ xzu∧ v 6= z) (⊆W∃)
⊢∃vw(xvw ⊆ xzu∧ vw 6= zu) (∨I)
=:xϒzu.
For item (iii), note that xyϒzy := ∃uv(xyuv ⊆ xyzy∧uv 6= zy), and we have
∃uv(xyuv ⊆ xyzy∧uv 6= zy) ⊢∃uv(xyuv ⊆ xyzy∧uv 6= zy∧ y = v) (Proposition 5.3(ii))
⊢∃uv(xyuv ⊆ xyzy∧u 6= z) (∨E)
⊢∃u(xyu⊆ xyz∧u 6= z) (⊆Ctr)
=:xyϒz.
The above example indicates that the actual strength of our deduction system of Inc goes beyond the com-
pleteness theorem (Theorem 6.5) proved in this paper. How far can we actually go then? There are obviously
barriers, as inclusion logic cannot be effectively axiomatized after all. For instance, in the context of anonymity
atoms, the author was not able to derive a simple (sound) implication “ϒx and x ⊆ y imply ϒy” in the system
of Inc. An easy solution for generating derivations of simple facts like this one would be to extend the current
system with new rules. But then how many new rules or which new rules should we add to the current system in
order to derive “sufficient” amount of sound consequences of Inc? One such candidate that is worth mentioning
is the natural and handy rule φ ∨¬α,α ∨ψ/φ ∨ψ (for α being first-order) that is sound and does not seem to be
derivable in our system. Finding other such rules is left for future research.
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